The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 59 | Number 3

August 1992

Being a Physician and Being Ethical
Arthur J. Dyck

Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Dyck, Arthur J. (1992) "Being a Physician and Being Ethical," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 59: No. 3, Article 10.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol59/iss3/10

Article 10

Being a Physician and Being Ethical
by

Arthur J. Dyck, Ph.D.

The author is a member of the Editorial Advisory board for The Linacre.
Being a physician is being ethical. There is no morally neutral definition of
being a physician. We cannot simply describe what it means to be a physician
without thereby describing attitudes and actions which are ethical at their very
core: Being a physician is being an individual with the knowledge and skills, the
attitudes and loyalties, required to prevent and cure diseases, and to alleviate pain
and suffering. The moral praise worthiness of such activities is not generally in
dispute.
But what if being a physician includes assisting in a suicide, or engaging in
mercy killing, or both? Shall the dictionary then have to redefine "physician,"
"doctor of medicine?" "Medicine" now is defined as "the science and art dealing
with the maintenance of health and the prevention, alleviation, or cure of
disease."l Are some physicians, and some of the public, now asking physicians
and the general public to understand that assisting in a suicide or mercy killing, if
added to the practice of medicine, will perfect it? How perfect it? By going
beyond the mitigation of suffering to its elimination. But if this is added to what it
means to be a doctor of medicine, is being a physician still synonymous with
being ethical? The struggle over the correct answer to that question is of deep
concern to both physicians and ethicists, and, for that matter, all of humanity.
But the proper answer to that question will not come to those who conceive of
the physician'S task in the way it is depicted in Webster's Ninth Collegiate
Dictionary, as cited above. According to Edmund Pellegrino, medicine "is not
science, but an art, informed both by science and ethics."2 Medicine applies the
knowledge obtained from science and ethics to the "alleviation of suffering, or the
cure, care, or prevention of human illness."3 The sociologist Eliot Friedson also
regards medicine as applied knowledge but considers science to be the distinctive
and sole source of its knowledge. And, though there has been some more general
rec0gnition in the past twenty years that ethics may contribute to medicine,
Pellegrino's evocation of theology and theological ethics is insufficiently
appreciated. And it is necessary to think theologically in order to understand and
to practice medicine.
My contention is that what separates those who favor assisting in a suicide
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and mercy killing from those who oppose such practices is a different theological
perspective. I wish to examine the presence of these differing theological
perspectives within two important court cases. It is important to realize that
theological assumptions and formulations are being made in settings which are
assumed to be free of theological and religious thinking, and that these
theological assumptions and formulations can, and do, make all the difference in
some cases. I wish, then, to contend as well, that being a physician and being
ethical is, in part, informed and shaped by one's theology. This I will illustrate by
exploring how theology frames our conceptions of 1) the nature and bases of
human rights; and 2) the nature and bases of virtue. In the first instance, I will
relate human rights to the questions around assisting in a suicide and mercy
killing. In the second instance, I will focus on the virtue of love or charity.

A. Theological Perspectives on Human Rights
There are three major traditions represented within the majority and dissenting
opinions of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the Brophy case. 4 These
traditions are all alive and functioning. They are a source of some major conflicts
over ethical issues in the United States and in many other nations. I refer to the
following three traditions: 1) the tradition of calculated rights (Utilitarian and
Libertarian); 2) the tradition of natural rights (Hobbesian and Lockean); and 3)
the tradition of natural obligations (all major religions and many philosophies
drawing on them).

1. The Tradition of Calculated Rights
This was the theological perspective of the majority opinion in the Brophy case
as delivered by Judge Liacos. First, some facts about the case.
Paul Brophy, a firefighter in his mid-forties, was diagnosed as being in a
semi-vegetative state from April of 1983 and at the time of the decision in
September of 1986. All therapeutic medical interventions were being withheld
and Brophy was breathing on his own. His care could best be described as aimed
at "comfort only" and it was excellent. He was free of bed sores, for example.
Food and water were being given through a G-tube and it was not creating any
adverse side effects. Medical experts testified that Brophy was not imminently
dying and that he could live for a number of years, perhaps more than twenty or
so. The majority, five of nine justices, was convinced that a lower court correctly
understood Brophy's comments to others earlier in his life as a wish on his part to
be allowed to die under these circumstances. He had, for example, once said that
he did not wish to live if he were to be in a situation like that of Karen Ann
Quinlan.
The question, then, as Judge Liacos frames it, is whether there is a state interest
to implement this wish, one that supersedes any other possible state interest to the
contrary. Liacos asserts that state interest in carrying out Brophy's alleged wish
by citing a right of self-determination which he regards as having deep roots in the
history of the United States. To make his argument, he quotes John Stuart
Mill:
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[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercized over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a significant warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do
or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,
because in the opinion of others to do so would be wise or even right. s

Liacos feels compelled to offer additional reasons for depicting Brophy's wish,
and the state's interest in carrying it out, as expressing a reasonable choice to die a
natural death rather than to be the subject of life-sustaining care. He considers
Brophy to be in a situation in which efforts to sustain life are in conflict with
medicine's obligation to relieve suffering. In what sense, however, can Brophy be
considered to be suffering? He argues that Brophy is in some kind of twilight zone
in which "the body lives in some fashion but the brain (or a significant part of it)
does not."6 On this very point, he cites another court case in which medical
procedures used to sustain life in such circumstances are said to be "accurately
described as a means of prolonging the dying process rather than a means of
continuing life."7 And he also cites other sources that speak of such continuation
of medical intervention as "protracted agony" and the choice to forego it as "a
right to die with dignity."8 In short, Liacos is contending that individuals should
be free to assert a right not to live under certain circumstances.
Within the majority opinion, as delivered by Liacos, no inalienable right to
life, under the protection of the state, is asserted on behalf of Brophy. Rather, a
right not to be interfered with is set forth, a private sphere in which the value of
one's life may be calculated by the individual. Effectively, the state has no interest
in protecting a life that is not desired. Justice Stevens of the U. S. Supreme Court
is explicit about this in his dissenting opinion regarding the case which involved
Nancy Cruzan: "A State that seeks to demonstrate its commitment to life may do
so by aiding those who are actively struggling for life and health."9 Liacos sees no
struggle for life in Brophy, and Stevens sees none in Cruzan. Nor do they regard
such a struggle as something individuals in their circumstances would wish to
carryon. And, so, a state need have no compelling interest in each individual life,
for the right to life is not inalienable and it may understandably be wished away.
But why am I thinking of the views of Liacos and Stevens as theological?
Religious faith is directed at an object of ultimate devotion and ultimate
authority. What Liacos and Stevens are doing is investing in the individual selves
the ultimate authority over whether they live or die. Liacos and Stevens might
wish to counter this by claiming that the state has some authority too and it
limits, in some circumstances, this authority of the individual. Even so, there are
those whose theology would not grant the kind of authority to individuals
granted them by Liacos and Stevens. Indeed, the other two traditions represented
in the Brophy decision would not make the obligation to protect life contingent
on whether or not individuals and states decide that they have such an obligation
in one context or another.
2. The Tradition of Natural Rights
Of the seven judges in the Brophy decision, three wrote dissenting opinions.
Justice Lynch dissented because, as he said, "My principal objection is that the
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State's interest in the preservation of life has not been given appropriate
weight"10 And, Lynch adds, "the majority nullify, if only in part, the law against
suicide."11 For Lynch,.the State's interest in the preservation oflife is an interest in
preserving the particular patient's life and in preserving the sanctity of all human
life. "Maintaining the sanctity of life," says Lynch, "may well be the reason
society invests the State with sovereign authority."12 Lynch mentions both
Hobbes and Locke as sources for this view.
Strictly speaking, if Lynch were to state his case in purely Hobbesian terms, the
reason for submitting to a sovereign is to preserve one's own life. This they do in
their quest for pleasure and avoidance of pain. Left to themselves, without a
sovereign power to curb them, individuals would live in a state of war, seeking
things for themselves, and endangering their lives and those of others in their
greed. Since, for Hobbes, the drive to preserve one's own life is a powerful and
natural one for everyone, he argued that the right to life is natural, and it is a claim
no rational individual would surrender to a sovereign. Indeed, the legitimacy of
governments rests on their actual ability to protect human life. To commit
suicide, from a Hobbesian perspective, is irrational and efforts should be made to
prevent it Lynch does explicitly see the State's interest in the prevention of
suicide as that of "the prevention of irrational self-destruction."13 Not all refusal
of treatment is to be regarded as an instance of such irrational self-destruction.
But, in Brophy's case, what is being refused is not burdensome and invasive, and
its refusal will be the reason he dies, and so there is reason to invoke the state's
interest in preventing what can be seen as a suicide. For the sake of caution,
Lynch would favor preserving Brophy's life, insofar as the provision of food and
water is involved.
Lynch, however, is not expressing his opinion in a purely Hobbesian way. He
speaks ofa state interest in preserving the sanctity of all life. This puts one in mind
of the Declaration of Independence in which the self-evident and inalienable
right to life is bestowed on the individual by the Creator. How consistently
Hobbesian Lynch is in his thinking is not something one can glean from what he
says in his dissenting opinion. What is clear is that individuals have a definite right
to life and to the State's protection of that right, including also protection against
irrational destruction by individuals of their own lives. In Hobbes, the theological
basis for this affirmation is a doctrine of human nature, one that depicts
individuals as seeking their own preservation. No one can be expected to regard it
as reasonable to ask or require anyone to relinquish the right to preserve one's
own life. Indeed, it is not even possible to take away a right that belongs to
individuals by their very nature, hence inalienable. In this tradition, rights, not
obligations, are primary. But a third tradition was represented in that Brophy
decision in which obligations are primary.
3. Rights based on Natural ObUgations

Justice Nolan feels compelled, not only to dissent, but also to wrjte a separate
opinion. Though, like Lynch, he asserts a state interest in protecting Brophy's life
and all of life; and though, like Lynch, he views removing food and water in this
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case as the proximate cause of death, he wishes to delineate what he regards as the
basis of U.S. laws:
I can think of nothi·ng more degrading to the human person than the balance the court
struck today in favor of death against life. It is but another triumph for the forces of
secular humanism (modem paganism) which have now succeeded in imposing their
anti-life principles at both ends of life's spectrum. Pro dolar.14

Nolan explicitly evokes a religious and theological difference between his
perspective on life and that of the majority. He wishes to put that theological
quarrel into the record.
As Nolan is aware, modern paganism thinks of itself as secular but that does
not mask its affinity with its ancient expressions which were religious rivals of
Christianity and Judaism. Before Greece embraced Christianity, Greek
physicians did administer poisons. This was true despite the fact that the
Hippocratic Oath, an ancient Greek document, prohibited giving poisons and
doing abortions. That Oath did win out but it did so as Christians embraced it,
and Christianity came to supplant ancient Greek and Roman religions and
cultures.
Nolan's affinity for a certain Christian view is abundantly clear. He notes that
the principle of double effect does not apply to Brophy's situation. Since the
G-tube was in place, food and water were not at that point of a medical
intervention. To deny Brophy food and water is therefore to intend death rather
than comfort as such. Nolan does accept the withdrawal of all medical
interventions for the sake of comfort but not for the sake of death, even if the
decision to avoid all burdensome treatments may have the unintended effect of
shortening life. But Brophy's death will be due to starvation, and in approving his
death, Nolan contends that the court is approving euthanasia and suicide. And,
says Nolan, "Suicide is direct self-destruction and is intrinsically evil. No set of
circumstances can make it moral."IS Although Nolan does not speak of rights in
his opinion, there is no doubt about his rejection of any "right" to commit suicide
or to request euthanasia. Asserting such "rights" would be to ignore the moral
obligation to avoid actions aimed at killing oneself or having oneself killed.
Nolan is exhibiting the Christian perspective, shared by the Jewish tradition, in
which obligations, not rights, are the primary moral concepts. I wish to illustrate
briefly the significance of this.
Whereas Hobbes and Locke depict human beings as striving to preserve their
own lives, the Jewish and Christian traditions have a social concept of human
striving. Indeed, one can identify natural moral obligations by asking what is
logically and substantively requisite for the formation and sustenance of human
communities. Among the requisites of community are the obligations to refrain
from killing, ourselves and others, and to procreate and nurture our lives and
those of others. Such nurture includes sustaining our parents in their old age, and
thus honoring them. 16 This obligation to bring others into being and to nurture
their lives, a natural proclivity for human beings, is not recognized as such by
Hobbes and Locke. In turn, Mill recognizes no natural obligation to refrain from
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killing ourselves; the natural basis for deciding whether to continue our own lives
rests on our quest to experience pleasure and avoid pain. From this perspective
life itself can be reasonably viewed as too painful or devoid of pleasure to sustain.
What, then, are rights, given the Jewish and Christian acceptance of certain
natural obligations? A right is the expectation that these natural obligations will
be fulfilled and observed in human relations. I have a right to life because others
are obligated to refrain from killing me and to nurture me. Individuals can claim
as a right that such obligations be met and fulfilled. The state has as one of its
fundamental purposes the enforcement of the obligations to refrain from killing
and to nurture. We have laws not only against murder, for example, but also
specifically against child neglect and abuse. Starving one's child would be a
failure to nurture, which, even short of the child's death, would justify
intervention. The right to nurture and the protection of one's health and life is
actualized by the obligations regarded as naturally binding and requisite to the
sustenance of our communal life as well as of the life of a helpless and dependent
child. The right to life is not some attribute of the child or a claim it makes, but
rather identifies what is owed that child by those who made and make its life
possible, and who in tum owe their lives to the restraint against killing and
nurture exhibited by others, individually and communally.
The professing Christian and Jew will likely see these natural obligations, on
which the actualization of human rights depend, also as Divine commands, part
of what it means to love God and neighbor. Nevertheless, these naturally
occurring requisites of community are known by our cognitive faculties and they
are binding on all human beings. If these Divine commandments were not also
recognizable by our natural faculties, God's judgment of our lives would be
grossly unfair, insofar as God would have created us without the ability to
recognize what God as the ultimate judge of our actions expects of us.
We have briefly reviewed three differing theological traditions regarding the
foundations of human rights. In the tradition of calculated rights, Mill can affirm
the rationality of suicide and assisting in it, since it is a calculus of the individual's
own happiness, or lack of it. And, it is our nature as humans to seek our own
pleasure (happiness) and to avoid pain (unhappiness). Where only the
individual's calculus will not harm others, interference in the freedom to make this
calculus and act on it is an unjustified deprivation of individual freedom. In the
Hobbesian and Lockean tradition of natural rights suicide is irrational and the
effort to prevent it keeps the individual from an act that is not an expression of
freedom, that is, of being in rational control of one's decisions. This is so because
human beings naturally seek to preserve their own lives, not to destroy them. In
the Jewish and Christian traditions, suicide and assisting in a suicide have been
regarded as morally wrong. Refraining from killing ourselves and others and
nurturing our own lives and those of others are an expression of our natural
proclivities to form and sustain communities. To act in accord with what is
requisite to forming and sustaining human relations and cooperative action is an
expression of freedom; to act against these requisites of community is to act
against our own natural proclivities and lose our freedom to realize our nature
and destiny as human beings.
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In this day and age, it is not possible to take for granted that those who profess
to be Jewish or Christian will reflect the doctrine of human nature which has
dominated the theology of these traditions; they will not necessarily find the
foundations for human rights in these natural obligations which are an expression
of our social nature, and render possible and actual our communal life and
individual life itself. Of course, one could argue that if professing Christians and
Jews affirm perspectives found in Hobbes or Mill, then these perspectives
become part of Christian and Jewish traditions. Be that as it may, what I have
tried to illustrate so far is that what we think theologically about the nature of
being human does make a difference with respect to whether or not suicide and
assisting in a suicide are ethically acceptable and hence whether or not the
physician who assists in a suicide or engages in mercy killing can still be regarded
as ethical.
B. Theological Perspectives on Virtue

To illustrate the significance of theology for what we regard as virtuous, I wish
to focus on the virtue of charity. When I speak of charity, I am speaking oflove,
of compassion, that is, of an ingredient that all agree should be found active
within the physician/patient relation.
Edmund Pellegrino, in the same article already cited, refers to "love" as
"charity" and depicts it as a theological virtue. 17 For Pellegrino this virtue has at
least two important manifestations: 1) It limits the pursuit of self-interest, such as
the pursuit of fees, fame, or the unwillingness to treat risky patients, whether
legally risky or infectious, like AIDS patients; 2) It limits the "right to privacy" in
certain ways so that, for example, physicians have no obligation to terminate a
life, should not conceal a person's AIDS infection from a spouse, and should not
assert their autonomy to do research to justify aborting a fetus for that purpose.
Pellegrino, at least in the article in question, appears to treat charity as a
distinctly Christian virtue. I do not wish to take up that aspect of his essay here.
Rather, I wish to argue that love as a limitation on self-interest and a right to
privacy is a theological virtue, and as such is, in certain respects, a virtue required
of all physicians and not Christians only.
1. Love as a Limit to Self-interest as an Ultimate Loyalty

There is a general consensus that physicians should serve the best interests or
good of their patients. To do this requires, among other things, an impartial
perspective. Suppose, however, that a physician's primary loyalty is to wealth, or
fame, or safety. Anyone ofthese, or all ofthem, may become a god or gods when
the physician's own self interest is god, that is the ultimate object of veneration
and loyalty. Even when wealth, or fame, or safety are not ultimate objects of
devotion but yet devoutly sought, they literally constitute interests in a conflicting
relationship with the good of the patient, especially when the patient is poor, or
risky to take on.
Worship of one's self and making one's own good our primary desire
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undermine an important assessment of what will attain what is good for the
patient. The self is always at best a partial perspective from which to make
judgments and decisions. So one way in which we try to achieve an impartial
point of view is by limiting our estimate of our own worth and powers. Another
way is to love others as we love ourselves. 18 To do this is to draw more positively
on the knowledge of what we consider good for ourselves and to seek that good
for others. 19 To do this is to love not only ourselves but also others with a love
similar to the love we have for ourselves.
It is hard to imagine that physicians who love their patients as they love
themselves would compromise care for a patient for the sake of cost
containment. In the Good Samaritan story, told to illustrate what it means to
love the neighbor as oneself, the Samaritan provides money to treat a person
described as half dead, and promises to provide more, if more is needed. The
Samaritan is not a gatekeeper but a gate opener.
2. Love as a Limit to a "Right to Privacy"
The Good Samaritan ideal involves love for God, as well as for one's
neighbors. Love for God is, among other things, love for an ultimately impartial
judge. The ideal standard of lovingly impartial judgments and practices is not
found in ourselves, certainly not to a degree that precludes error and uncertainty.
Love for God, a love in which the self is not the object of our highest devotion, is
love for the ultimate source of our powers and capacities, includes our ability and
willingness to love our neighbors as ourselves.
Love for God, when the self is not god, means also love for the natural
obligations, the communal bonds, which tie us to one another as human beings.
"My health" and "my body" are not seen as our own exclusive concerns, and
what we do about our health and our bodies is seen as affecting others. There is
no such a thing as harming only ourselves when we do what is hurtful and
destructive of our health or of our bodies. How I live while dying affects others
and our communities. Dying is no purely private domain or concern, even when
it takes place in the relative privacy and intimacy of our own homes.
Love for God, when the self is not god, means also love for a community of
worship and of moral instruction. It is in communities of faith and worship that
inspiration and continued education in theology and virtue can be had. And it is
in communities of faith and worship that we can express gratitude for the gifts we
have, and for life itself, for we did not, and could not, endow ourselves, either
with life or with the capacities we bring to it. Physicians will not be sufficiently
prepared to serve the good of patients if their loyalties do not go beyond their
loyalties to themselves and to their scientific and medical communities, to
include loyalty to communities of worship and moral instruction.
Moses said all this well just after he was allowed to view the land promised to
his people and shortly before his death. He said it in a speech to his people as he
visualizes their entry into the land which is to be their place of worship. In this
speech he urges them to love God and keep God's commandments, for to
worship and serve other gods is the way of death: "Therefore," he says, "choose
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life, that you and your descendants may live."20
In this essay, I have argued that what it means to be a physician is partly
shaped and defined by a physician's theological perspective, implicitly or
explicitly, as the case may be. And, what it means to be a compassionate
physician is also partly shaped and defined by a physician's theological
perspective. Thomas Sydenham, a famous seventeenth century (1624-1689)
English physician, illustrates very well how a theological perspective can
contribute to defining an impartial and compassionate perspective for
physicians. I cite three of four things he wishes all doctors to take seriously:
First, that he must one day give an account to the Supreme Judge of all the lives
entrusted to his care. Secondly, that all his skill, and knowledge and energy as they have
been given him by God, so they should be exercized for His glory and the good of
mankind, and not for mere gain or ambition . . . . And, fourthly, that the doctor, being
himself a mortal man, should be diligent and tender in relieving his suffering patients,
inasmuch as he himself must one day be a like sufferer. 21
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